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JUST WHO CAN YOU SUE? THE CYR 
APPROACH TO DETERMINING PROPER 
DEFENDANTS IN ERISA ACTIONS 
Abstract: On June 22, 2011, in Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a 
third-party insurer is a proper defendant in an ERISA action, and that po-
tential liability under ERISA is not limited to the benefits plan itself or the 
designated plan administrator. In doing so, the court increased protec-
tions for benefit plan participants and gave third-party insurers and em-
ployers incentives to act fairly and responsibly when deciding employee 
claims. Accordingly, this Comment argues that the Cyr approach, com-
pared to approaches taken by other circuits, most closely reflects the legis-
lative intent behind ERISA to protect American workers’ benefits in a uni-
form manner. 
Introduction 
 Under section 1132(a)(1)(B) of the Employment Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA), employees who participate in healthcare 
and benefit plans may bring claims to recover benefits or enforce rights 
under the terms of those plans.1 Although the statute expressly states 
who may bring these actions and under what circumstances, it does not 
expressly state which entities may be named as defendants.2 In 2007, 
Laura Cyr brought an action against Channel Technologies, Inc.—her 
employer and the designated plan administrator—and Reliance Stan-
dard Life Insurance Company—the insurer, which made determina-
tions to grant or deny participants’ claims for increased disability pay-
ments.3 Reliance filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that, 
as a third-party insurer, it was not a proper defendant in an ERISA ac-
tion.4 Yet, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, overruling 
many of its prior decisions, held that any party with discretionary con-
                                                                                                                      
1 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006). “A civil action may be brought . . . by a participant 
or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce 
his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the 
terms of the plan.” Id. 
2 Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). 
3 Id. at 1204. 
4 Id. 
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trol over an employee benefits plan is a proper defendant in an ERISA 
action.5 
 This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s approach to section 
1132(a)(1)(B) most closely reflects the legislative intent behind ER-
ISA.6 Part I provides a factual and procedural history of the Cyr case 
and briefly discusses ERISA, specifically section 1132.7 Then, Part II 
discusses how, in prior ERISA actions, the Ninth Circuit and other cir-
cuits have determined proper defendants.8 Further, it discusses flaws in 
these earlier applications.9 Finally, Part III argues that, of those deci-
sions, Cyr most closely aligns with the legislative intent behind ERISA by 
protecting benefit plan participants from abuses by all entities that have 
discretionary authority over employee benefits plans, regardless of the 
entity’s title as a “plan administrator.”10 
                                                                                                                     
I. Cyr and Proper Defendants Under ERISA 
A. Cyr’s Suit, Lower Court Decisions, and the Insurer’s Reluctance to Pay 
 Channel Technologies, Inc. (“CTI”) employed Laura Cyr (“Cyr”) 
as a vice president.11 As an employee of CTI, Cyr received long-term 
disability benefits under a program that was insured by the Reliance 
Standard Life Insurance Company (“Reliance”).12 Although only Reli-
ance decided whether to honor or deny employee benefits claims, it 
did not hold the title of “plan administrator.”13 
 
5 Id. at 1206–07; see also Ford v. MCI Commc’ns Corp. Health & Welfare Plan, 399 F.3d 
1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a “claims administrator,” which had the exclusive 
authority to determine benefit eligibility, was not a proper defendant because it was not 
the benefit plan or “plan administrator”), overruled by Cyr, 642 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that ER-
ISA permitted plaintiffs to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity, and granting 
summary judgment in favor of the plan administrator and the employer). 
6 See infra notes 67–78 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 11–40 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 41–66 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 41–66 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 67–78 and accompanying text. 
11 Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1205. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. Although holding the title of plan administrator is not a requirement for liability 
under ERISA, multiple courts have used this term as a benchmark for determining liabil-
ity. See Ford, 399 F.3d at 1081–82; Hall v. LHACO, Inc., 140 F.3d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that the proper defendant in a section 32(a)(1)(B) claim is either the plan or the 
designated plan administrator); Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186, 
187 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the proper defendant in a section 1132(a)(1)(B) claim 
is the plan administrator). 
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 In October 2000, Cyr was terminated as vice president of CTI.14 
Shortly thereafter, she filed a claim for long-term disability benefits be-
cause of a back condition.15 Reliance approved Cyr’s claim and subse-
quently paid out benefits based on her $85,000 annual salary.16 
 The following year, Cyr filed suit against CTI, alleging sex dis-
crimination based on unequal pay.17 She claimed that her salary was 
approximately half of that paid to male employees of similar skill, ef-
fort, and responsibility.18 Cyr and CTI reached a settlement agreement 
that retroactively increased her salary to $155,000, effective one week 
prior to her termination date.19 Cyr then contacted Reliance about in-
creasing her benefits in accordance with her increased salary.20 Al-
though a Reliance representative stated that additional benefits would 
be paid to Cyr provided that there was a legitimate basis for the up-
graded salary, Reliance never paid any increased benefits.21 
 As a result, seeking increased ERISA benefits, Cyr filed an action 
against the CTI Group Long Term Disability Benefit Program (the 
“Plan”), CTI in its capacity as the plan administrator, and Reliance.22 
Reliance moved for summary judgment claiming that, as a mere third-
party insurer, it was not a proper defendant.23 Initially, in 2007, the U.S. 
District Court for the Central District of California granted Reliance’s 
motion in Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., holding that only 
the plan or plan administrator could be held liable under ERISA.24 
Based on the parties’ supplemental briefings, however, the district 
court changed its ruling and entered summary judgment for Cyr.25 Re-
liance appealed, and the Ninth Circuit agreed to hear the case en banc 
to reconsider and clarify its precedent as to which parties may be sued 
in an ERISA action.26 
                                                                                                                      
14 Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1205. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1205. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
25 Id. at 1168, 1174. The court found that Reliance was indeed liable because case law 
“left room for suits against insurers so long as they are functioning as the plan administra-
tor,” and Reliance was functioning as such by nature of its exclusive discretion over em-
ployee claims. Id. 
26 Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1203, 1205. 
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B. ERISA: Congress’s Quest for Uniform Employee Protection 
 Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, in part, to ensure uniform em-
ployee benefit regulation throughout the nation.27 By creating a com-
prehensive body of federal law, Congress hoped to reduce the adminis-
trative costs of determining specific state regulations, thereby preventing 
plans from passing those costs on to American workers.28 To achieve this 
goal, ERISA preempts all state law “related to” employee benefit plans.29 
In preempting all state employee benefit laws, Congress sought to en-
sure that ERISA would provide identical protections to citizens of all 
states.30 
 In addition, Congress intended for ERISA to protect employees 
from losing benefits if a plan failed to accumulate and retain sufficient 
funds and from potential abuses by those in control of benefits.31 Spe-
cifically, section 1132 (a)(1)(B) provides that a plan participant or 
beneficiary may bring an action “to recover benefits due to him under 
the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, 
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the plan.”32 Although 
this provision provides the circumstances under which a plan partici-
pant may bring an ERISA action, it is notably silent as to who may be 
named as a defendant.33 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Katherine A. McCallister, Note, A Distinction Without a Difference? ERISA Preemption 
and the Untenable Differential Treatment of Revocation-on-Divorce and Slayer Statutes, 52 B.C. L. 
Rev. 1481, 1486 (2011) (explaining that Congress’ desire for uniform benefit rights for all 
Americans and concern that differing state law would undercut these rights for some citi-
zens motivated its decision to have ERISA broadly preempt all state laws regarding em-
ployee benefit plans); John M. Teske, Notes & Comments, Damages Suits Under ERISA: Why 
Third Parties with Discretion over Benefits Plans Must Be Held Accountable, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 
1753, 1757 (2003). 
28 See McCallister, supra note 27, at 1486; Teske, supra note 27, at 1757. 
29 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006); see Jay Conison, Employee Benefit Plans in a Nut-
shell 69 (1993) (noting Congress’ concerns over employees being treated unfairly by 
plans and the lack of recourse available to them). 
30 See Teske, supra note 27, at 1757; see also Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
738 F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining that Congress intended for “the courts . . . 
to formulate a nationally uniform federal common law to supplement the explicit provi-
sions and general policies set out in ERISA”). 
31 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001a (c) (stating that the policy of ERISA is to provide reasonable 
protection for the interests of participants and beneficiaries of financially distressed em-
ployee benefit plans); Conison, supra note 29, at 69. 
32 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); see Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1205. 
33 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 
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C. Resolving the Proper Defendant Question in Cyr 
 In Cyr, the Ninth Circuit relied on the plain language of ERISA to 
reach its conclusion that entities other than the plan administrator may 
be sued to enforce rights under an employee benefit plain.34 The court 
noted that although section 1132 limits the types of ERISA actions 
which a plaintiff may bring, and limits the parties which may bring 
those actions, the section does not limit potential defendants in those 
claims.35 The court held that because the statute does not limit who can 
be sued, entities other than the plan and plan administrator may be 
sued in “appropriate circumstances,” such as when another party is di-
rectly involved with a plan participant’s claim.36 
 Accordingly, in Cyr, the court held that Reliance was a proper de-
fendant, even though Reliance lacked the title of plan administrator, 
because it nonetheless functioned in this capacity.37 Cyr’s employer, 
CTI, was the named plan administrator, even though the company did 
not deny Cyr’s original claim for increased benefits.38 Instead, Reliance, 
the third-party insurer, paid out initial benefits and denied Cyr’s claim 
for increased benefits.39 Therefore, the court concluded that Reliance 
was a logical defendant in Cyr’s claim to recover benefits because Reli-
ance was the party actually responsible for the disbursement of benefits 
and the denial of her claim.40 
                                                                                                                      
34 See id.; Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1204–05. 
35 Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1205. The Ninth Circuit also noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had 
addressed the liability question under a different subsection of section 1132(a) in Harris 
Trust v. Savings Smith Barney, Inc. 530 U.S. 238 (2000). Id. Harris presented the more compli-
cated question of whether a defendant was a fiduciary of a pension trust, but the Ninth Cir-
cuit emphasized that the Supreme Court “rejected the suggestion that there was a limitation 
contained within section 1132(a)(3) on who could be a proper defendant” in an ERISA suit. 
Id.; see Harris, 530 U.S. at 241. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that in this more straightforward 
case, there was “no reason to read a limitation into [section] 1132(a)(1)(B) that the Su-
preme Court did not perceive in [section] 1132(a)(3).” Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1206. 
36 Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1204–05. The Ninth Circuit pointed to another companion section 
of the statute to support its conclusion that liability should not be limited to plans and 
administrators. Id. at 1206–07. Section 1132(d)(2) requires that “any money judgment 
under this subchapter against an employee benefit plan shall be enforceable only against 
the plan as an entity and shall not be enforceable against any other person unless liability 
under such person is established in his individual capacity under this subchapter.” 29 
U.S.C. § 1132 (d)(2). The Cyr court reasoned that “the ‘unless’ clause necessarily indicates 
that parties other than plans can be sued for money damages under other provisions of 
ERISA, such as [section] 1132(a)(1)(B), as long as the party’s individual liability has been 
established.” Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1207. 
37 See Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1207. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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II. Circuit Split on Proper Defendants Under ERISA 
 Federal circuit courts to have considered which entities may be 
named defendants in ERISA actions have split, thereby undermining 
Congress’s goal of uniformity for all employee benefit plans.41 Some 
courts permit suits against only the Plan and the named plan adminis-
trator; other courts take a less restrictive approach.42 
 The Cyr decision is the culmination of the Ninth Circuit’s progres-
sion from a restrictive view of section 1132(a)(1)(B) to one that pro-
vides comprehensive protection for employees.43 Initially, in 1985, in 
Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., the Ninth Circuit took a restrictive ap-
proach and held that under ERISA plaintiffs may only recover benefits 
against the benefits plan itself.44 In Gelardi, the court rejected a suit 
against the designated plan administrator even though the administra-
tor was responsible for denying the plaintiff’s benefit claim.45 There-
fore, under the Gelardi approach, the benefits plan was the only permis-
sible defendant, and if the plan lacked funds, the employee’s recovery 
was seriously limited.46 As a result of this limited recovery under this 
approach, the access to the courts provided by section 1132(a)(1)(B) 
offered little protection to an employee.47 In fact, this approach essen-
tially relieves the benefit plan of its obligations to the employee, 
                                                                                                                      
41 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990) (ex-
pressing concerns that non-uniform state regulations for plans would lead to inefficient 
administration of plans and decreased benefits); see, e.g., Everhart v. Allmerica Fin. Life 
Ins., 275 F.3d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 2001); Hall v. LHACO, Inc., 140 F.3d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 
1998); Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186, 187 (11th Cir. 1997); Jass 
v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1490 (7th Cir. 1996). 
42 See Everhart, 275 F.3d at 754; Hall, 140 F.3d at 1194; Garren, 114 F.3d at 187; Jass, 88 
F.3d at 1490. 
43 See Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011); Ever-
hart, 275 F.3d at 754 (summarizing the Ninth Circuit decisions regarding who can be sued 
in a section 502(a)(1)(B) action). 
44 761 F.2d 1323, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985). The Seventh Circuit cited Gelardi when it 
reached a similar conclusion in Jass. 88 F.3d at 1490 (stating that the only “appropriate 
defendant for a denial of benefits claim would be the ‘Plan’”). 
45 Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324. 
46 See id.; Candace Budy & Richard Bales, Naming a Defendant in an ERISA Action, 9 
Transactions Tenn. J. Bus. L. 317, 337 (2008) (discussing the significant potential draw-
backs of allowing only the Plan to be named as a defendant and the impact of the Gelardi 
holding on ERISA actions); Teske, supra note 27, at 1757. 
47 See Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324; Budy & Bales, supra note 46, at 337; Teske, supra note 
27, at 1757. 
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thereby undercutting Congress’s overarching intent to protect individ-
ual employee benefits.48 
 Further, the reality of modern business is that multiple entities are 
often involved in financial decisions like the disbursement of benefit 
plans.49 Thus, although the Gelardi approach provides a bright-line test 
for courts, it leaves those other entities—including administrators and 
employers, that often exercise as much or more control over employee 
benefits than the named plan—with no incentive to protect employees, 
because those entities are guaranteed to avoid liability for their deci-
sions.50 
 Following Gelardi, other circuit courts moved away from this most 
restrictive approach that allowed for only one potential defendant.51 
For example, in 1998, in Layes v. Mead Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit held that the plan administrator was a proper 
defendant because of its control over the administration of benefits.52 
Additionally, in 1993, in Taft v. Equitable Life Insurance Society, the Ninth 
Circuit departed from the Gelardi approach and allowed ERISA actions 
against both benefit plans and plan administrators.53 
 In allowing the plan administrator to be named as a defendant, 
the court began to move closer to the legislative intent behind ERISA.54 
In many cases, plan administrators make decisions regarding grants 
and denials of claims.55 Accordingly, holding plan administrators liable 
provides them with incentives to make the right decisions for employ-
ees.56 Absent the disincentive of being sued, administrators consistently 
err on the side of the employers for whom they work.57 
 Although the approach followed in Layes and Taft offered more 
protection than the Gelardi approach, this interpretation of ERISA still 
                                                                                                                      
48 See Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324; Budy & Bales, supra note 46, at 337; Teske, supra note 
27, at 1757. 
49 See Teske, supra note 27, at 1774–75 (discussing the exponential growth of employee 
benefit plans since ERISA’s enactment in 1974). 
50 See Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324; Teske, supra note 27, at 1775–76. 
51 See Hall, 140 F.3d at 1194 (holding that the proper defendant in a section 
32(a)(1)(B) claim is either the plan or the designated plan administrator); Garren, 114 
F.3d at 187 (holding that the proper defendant in a section 1132(a)(1)(B) claim is the 
plan administrator). 
52 132 F.3d 1246, 1249 (8th Cir. 1998). 
53 9 F.3d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993). 
54 See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
55 See Garren, 114 F.3d at 187. 
56 See Budy & Bales, supra note 46, at 338. 
57 See id. 
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limited the rights of participants in benefits plans.58 In 2005, in Ford v. 
MCI Communications Corp. Health & Welfare Plan, however, the court fur-
ther expanded employees’ ERISA rights.59 In Ford, the plaintiff was em-
ployed by MCI and enrolled in its employee health plan.60 MCI was 
named in all documents as the plan administrator and another com-
pany, Hartford Insurance (“Hartford”), was designated the “claims ad-
ministrator.”61 MCI, the plan administrator, delegated the determina-
tion of all benefits eligibility questions solely to the claims administrator, 
Hartford.62 Although Hartford was unequivocally responsible for deny-
ing the plaintiff’s benefit claim, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment for Hartford.63 Yet, rather than con-
sidering Hartford’s sole discretion over employee claims, the court fo-
cused on Hartford’s title as “claims administrator” and not “plan admin-
istrator.”64 
 Although in cases like Ford the court held both benefit plans and 
plan administrators liable, this approach still left significant gaps in 
employee protections.65 Under this approach, claims administrators or 
insurers with broad authority over benefit plans have no incentive to 
act fairly toward employees because they face no potential liability for 
their actions.66 
III. The Cyr Approach: Carrying Out Congressional Intent 
 In Cyr, the Ninth Circuit moved away from the bright-line rules it 
had articulated in prior cases by allowing Cyr to sue a third-party in-
surer that had discretionary authority over her claim, even though it 
did not hold the title of plan administrator.67 In doing so, the court 
                                                                                                                      
 
58 See Layes, 132 F.3d at 1249; Taft, 9 F.3d at 1471; Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324. 
59 See 399 F.3d 1076, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2005). 
60 Id. at 1078. 
61 Id. 
62 Id at 1081–82. The claims administrator, Hartford, was given “exclusive authority, re-
sponsibility, and right to interpret and construe the Plan’s terms and to determine all 
questions of eligibility under the Plan and to exercise the fullest administration permitted 
by law regarding Plan administration.” Id. 
63 See id. at 1078, 1083. 
64 See id. at 1081–83. 
65 See 399 F.3d at 1081–82. 
66 See Budy & Bales, supra note 46, at 340–41 (discussing that ERISA lawsuits can be in-
centives for entities with decision-making authority to make fair and proper decisions). 
67 Compare Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(adopting an approach that holds liable any party that is a logical defendant based on its 
involvement with a participant’s claim), with Ford v. MCI Commc’ns Corp. Health & Wel-
fare Plan, 399 F.3d 1076, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a suit against the party solely 
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moved closer to the legislative intent behind ERISA by holding respon-
sible the party most closely involved in deciding Cyr’s initial claim.68 
 The courts do not advance the legislative intent behind ERISA by 
applying rigid technical rules and shielding from responsibility the 
party responsible for accepting or denying claims based on that party’s 
title.69 Instead, Congress drafted ERISA to improve the fairness and 
effectiveness of the employee benefit plan system for all American 
workers and to protect employees from potential abuses of the benefit 
plan system.70 Thus, the Cyr holding, which looks to the substance of 
the relationships and permits parties who have discretion over em-
ployee benefit plans to be named as defendants regardless of their 
formal title, more closely matches congressional intent.71 
                                                                                                                     
 Further, the Cyr approach reflects the reality of the modern health-
care system.72 Seventy percent of consumer healthcare expenditures are 
now paid for through some type of third-party insurer that has no direct 
relationship with the employee.73 Naturally, these insurers will seek to 
cut costs when possible in the claim review process by denying employee 
claims.74 Therefore, by holding third-party insurers liable, the court pro-
vides them with an incentive to make prudent decisions regarding em-
ployee claims.75 
 In addition, the Cyr approach provides employees increased pro-
tection from under-funded plans and erroneous benefit denials by en-
suring that employees are able to hold responsible entities that are dis-
cretion over their claims.76 This approach ensures that a plaintiff will 
not be left without a remedy because a plan is under-funded or because 
a plan administrator was not actually involved in the decision-making 
process.77 Therefore, the Cyr decision, in looking beyond bright-line 
 
responsible for employee benefits claims because the party did not hold the title of “plan 
administrator), and Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that the only appropriate defendant in an ERISA action is the Plan itself). 
68 See Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1206–07; Budy & Bales, supra note 46, at 340–41; Teske, supra 
note 27, at 1757. 
69 See Ford, 399 F.3d at 1081–82; Budy & Bales, supra note 46, at 340–41. 
70 See McAllister, supra note 27, at 1486; Teske, supra  note 27, at 1757. 
71 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006); see Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1207. 
72 See Teske, supra note 27, at 1775 (discussing the set-up of the majority of American 
healthcare plans and the need to hold all parties who have a financial stake in them liable 
for participant protection). 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 1775–76. 
75 See id. at 1776; Fossen v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., 660 F.3d 1102, 1110 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (permitting a section 1132(a)(1)(B) action against a third-party insurer). 
76 See Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1207. 
77 See id. 
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rules, provides far more protection for employees than its predecessors 
and, in doing so, more clearly achieves the goals of ERISA.78 
Conclusion 
 In drafting ERISA, Congress intended to provide all employee 
benefit plan participants with an identical set of rights. Those rights 
would protect participants from underfunded plans and from abuses by 
those with discretionary authority over benefit claims. Yet, in the years 
since ERISA’s enactment, circuit courts inconsistently applied ERISA, 
thereby undermining congressional intent to create a unified plan and 
to provide employees with these protections. Furthermore, through 
these decisions, some circuit courts shielded entities with discretionary 
authority over benefit claims from liability, when those entities lacked a 
designated title. In doing so, however, the circuit courts removed those 
entities’ incentives to act fairly and prudently toward employees in the 
future. 
 In Cyr, the Ninth Circuit moved significantly closer to fulfilling the 
policy underlying ERISA by looking closely at the discretionary author-
ity—not simply the title—of potential defendants. The Cyr decision 
protects employees by giving them additional recourse in the court sys-
tem against any entity that made decisions regarding their benefits. 
Furthermore, it provides incentives to those who have discretion over 
benefit plans to act in the best interest of the employee-participants. 
Thus, to protect employee benefits in a uniform, and more effective, 
manner courts should permit employees to bring suit against entities 
with discretion over benefit plans, even if those entities lack the title of 
plan administrator. 
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78 See id.; Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining that 
a primary purpose of ERISA was to “safeguard the well-being and security of working men 
and women and to apprise them of their rights and obligations under any employee bene-
fit plan”); Teske, supra note 27, at 1776–77. 
